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Abstract
We use an oligopoly model of intra-industry trade to examine the implications of foreign direct invest-
ment for the pollution haven hypothesis and environmental policy. Countries which lower environmental
standards to be more competitive in world markets generate pollution havens if environmental policy
is ￿xed. However, if FDI is a viable option as a mode of entry, pro￿t-shifting considerations weaken
in favour of environmental considerations and FDI-recipients tighten environmental policy, weakening
the pollution haven hypothesis by reducing incentives to relocate production. Interestingly, FDI may
still occur in spite of the stricter standards in order to level the playing ￿eld. We derive conditions
under which the FDI-receiving country has an incentive to manipulate its environmental standard to
prevent or attract FDI, potentially eliminating or creating pollution havens. Without manipulation of
standards, FDI leads to improvements in world pollution levels. However, when countries manipulate
their standards, FDI can lead to a dirtier environment if the two countries are substantially di⁄erent in
their valuation of environmental damages.
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11 Introduction
As the global economy has become more integrated, ￿ ows of foreign direct investment (FDI) have in-
creased signi￿cantly. In 2003, 64,000 multinationals controlled more than 870,000 foreign a¢ liates world-
wide (UNCTAD, 2008) and their sales exceeded $18 trillion (compared to world exports of $8 trillion).
Cognizant of this trend, policymakers and researchers have focused on the welfare implications of FDI and
on identifying economic variables that are instrumental in FDI decisions. Opponents to international trade
and investment ￿ ows frequently argue that globalization and the presence of multinationals cause too lax
environmental policies and ￿pollution havens￿to emerge (Newell, 2001; Cole et al., 2006). According to the
Pollution Haven Hypothesis (PHH), di⁄erences in pollution regulation across countries constitute a signif-
icant determinant of trade patterns and FDI/capital ￿ ows as ￿rms in highly pollution-intensive industries
have incentives to relocate their operations in countries with less stringent environmental standards. In
Eskeland and Harrison (2003), the PHH is best seen as a corollary to the theory of comparative advantage:
if it is more costly to conform to more stringent environmental standards at home, pro￿t-maximizing ￿rms
would want to relocate their production activities.
As noted in Taylor (2004), a necessary, although not su¢ cient, condition for the PHH is the presence of
a ￿pollution haven e⁄ect￿which results when a tightening of environmental regulation deters exports (or
stimulates imports) of dirty goods. While support for the latter is provided in several empirical studies, the
evidence for or against the former (that is, the PHH) is rather limited. Although there exists a growing body
of evidence in support of a signi￿cant link between the stringency of pollution regulations and the location
of foreign direct investment and the size of net trade ￿ ows in U.S. manufacturing industries (List and Co,
2000; Keller and Levinson, 2002; Ederington and Minier, 2003), thus suggesting a fairly strong response by
￿rms to di⁄erences in environmental regulation, there is little evidence that regulatory di⁄erences constitute
the most relevant determinant of trade ￿ ows as the PHH predicts. Various reasons why this is the case
from an empirical viewpoint have been proposed (e.g., data, measurement of environmental stringency);
however, reasons why the PHH may fail theoretically have not received much attention.
The focus of existing theoretical and empirical literatures is mostly on the e⁄ects of local environmental
policies on investment ￿ ows (List and Co, 2000; Keller and Levinson, 2002; Javorcik and Wei, 2004; Xing
and Kolstad, 2002). Most closely related to our paper is Markusen et al. (1993, 1995). In the 1993
article, a single active regional government in￿ uences the plant location of a single ￿rm with increasing
returns to scale and local pollution; in the 1995 article, the plant location problem is extended to the
case in which both regional governments are active in policy setting. Several extensions to this framework
2have been examined, including zero transportation costs (Hoel, 1997). Other modi￿cations include policy
commitment/time consistency (Ulph and Valentini, 2001; Petrakis and Xepapadeas, 2003) and asymmetric
relocation information (Greaker, 2003).1 Our analytical framework di⁄ers from these models in several
important ways. First, rather than examining the impact of environmental policy on the location decision
of production, we focus on the impact of the option for FDI (potential relocation of production) on the
choice of environmental policy. Second, instead of a single ￿rm choosing to locate in both regions (multi-
plant), one region, or no region, we assume two independent ￿rms producing for (and competing in) the
two markets. Third, we do not rely on increasing returns to scale or shipping costs to in￿ uence the
location (FDI) decision. Finally, instead of two symmetric regions selecting environmental policy, we rely
on the two countries placing di⁄erent weights on environmental damages to generate environmental policy
di⁄erences in the absence of FDI (that is, to induce a PHH incentive for FDI). Another related paper
is Cole et al. (2006), in which a model of political economy with lobbying and government corruption is
employed to explicitly examine the relationship between FDI and environmental policy. While the e⁄ect on
environmental policy of an additional (foreign) producer is considered, the entry decision of the foreign ￿rm
is exogenous; we, on the other hand, are interested in the choice of FDI and how this choice is manipulated
through environmental policy, depending on the external bene￿ts of FDI. While the key proposition in
Cole et al. that foreign entry results in stricter environmental policy (when corruption is low) is con￿rmed
in most of the cases we cover, we encounter cases in which FDI does not occur but environmental policy
is still a⁄ected.
In the present paper, we aim at ￿lling the gap in the literature by addressing the following questions: (1)
Under what conditions do di⁄erences in environmental regulation across countries give ￿rms in countries
with more stringent standards incentives to engage in FDI in countries with less stringent standards (this
question is directly related to the PHH)? (2) How do these incentives a⁄ect local environmental policy
and welfare in recipient countries? (3) Under what circumstances would an FDI-recipient country choose
to tighten its environmental policy in response to FDI? (4) If this tightening occurs, would the recipient
country ever select an environmental standard that is tighter than the standard of the source country (that
is, would the recipient ever become more ￿green￿than the originally green country)? (5) If FDI reduces the
welfare of the recipient country, would the recipient country manipulate its standard to prevent FDI? (6)
More generally, under what conditions would the recipient country adjust its emission standard to attract
FDI when the source country would prefer exporting and to prevent FDI when the source country would
1Although the threat is present, relocation never occurs in Greaker (2003).
3prefer engaging in FDI? (7) What is the impact of FDI on the state of the environment worldwide and in
the FDI-recipient country when FDI is either induced or prevented and when it is not?
To answer the above questions, we use a two-country oligopoly model of intra-industry trade. As
in the perfectly competitive model employed in Copeland and Taylor (1994), we assume pollution to be
purely local and allow for a technology that abates emissions of pollution. Both countries have the same
production and abatement technologies. In order to examine the implications of FDI, we consider a three-
stage game. In the ￿rst stage, countries simultaneously decide their environmental policy, choosing the
emission standards for local ￿rms that maximize welfare de￿ned as the sum of consumer surplus and
producer surplus less environmental damages. Each country takes into account environmental damages
when setting environmental policy, but the two countries di⁄er in the weight they assign to environmental
damage.2 The second stage of the game involves the ￿rm￿ s decision about whether to serve foreign markets
through export or FDI. In this setup, the ￿rm in the country with more stringent environmental standards
could move production to the country with more lax standards, depending on the bene￿ts of such a move
relative to the cost of setting up a foreign plant.3 Finally, ￿rms engage in Cournot competition in the
product markets. In order to maintain the focus of the analysis on the implications of asymmetric emission
standards for foreign direct investment, we ignore trade policy.
In the absence of FDI, the country which places less emphasis on environmental damage has an incentive
to lower environmental standards to become more competitive in world markets; however, once FDI is
available as a mode of entry, the country is confronted with two con￿ icting e⁄ects of FDI. On one hand,
FDI has a positive e⁄ect through greater local production/consumption associated with lower domestic
prices (higher consumer surplus) and may generate external bene￿ts. On the other hand, FDI has a negative
e⁄ect through lower pro￿ts for the domestic ￿rm due to a loss in competitive advantage (lower producer
surplus) and additional environmental damages from greater local production. If the home country assigns
a higher weight on environmental damage than the foreign country does, the former can be considered, in
the absence of an FDI option, as the more environmentally friendly or ￿green￿country while the latter
is the less environmental friendly or ￿grey￿country. As the home country becomes more environmentally
sensitive (as its weight on environmental damage increases), it chooses more stringent emission standards
while the foreign country chooses less stringent standards.
We ￿rst consider a traditional PHH case in which the foreign country does not alter its emission standard
2We consider two similar countries to avoid non-environmental policy related incentives for FDI. The model is thus best
suited for the analysis of the impact of FDI on policy setting among equally industrialized countries rather than between
North and South.
3We ignore the possibility of reciprocal FDI and focus on the FDI decision of the home ￿rm.
4in response to FDI. Not surprisingly, we show that, as long as the ￿xed cost of having an additional plant
is su¢ ciently low and abatement is costly, the home ￿rm facing a less stringent environmental standard
abroad has incentives to relocate its production to the foreign country (the traditional PHH case). We
then allow for the possibility that the host country is able to respond to FDI and examine the Subgame
Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE) under various conditions. When FDI occurs, the foreign country has
two active producers within its borders, and the relocated home ￿rm faces the same standard as the
foreign ￿rm. Thus, the pro￿t-shifting motive disappears while the environmental damage e⁄ect widens
and the foreign country tightens its emission standard. When the two countries are su¢ ciently similar
in weighing environmental damages, the ￿grey￿country (foreign country) can become greener than the
originally ￿green￿ country (home country). More interestingly, there are cases in which the home ￿rm
chooses to engage in FDI (rather than to export) in the foreign country even though the foreign emission
standard is stricter than its own standard under the export case. Intuitively, as countries become more
asymmetric in their environmental friendliness, the gap between their standards increases under export;
as long as the asymmetry is not too large, the home ￿rm would prefer to relocate to the foreign country
in order to level the playing ￿eld even if relocation entails facing a tighter standard.4
When allowing the foreign country to respond to the home ￿rm￿ s FDI, we later consider the question
of whether the foreign country can induce export (FDI) via preventing (attracting) FDI by adjusting
its standard and, if so, whether this move leads to higher welfare in the foreign country and a cleaner
environment worldwide. We obtain that, when the extra weight the home country assigns to environmental
damage is low and the bene￿t the foreign country derives from the home country￿ s FDI is high, the foreign
country is better o⁄ inducing the home ￿rm to engage in FDI by increasing its emission standard above
the level prevailing under export; when the extra weight is high and the bene￿t is low, the foreign country
is better o⁄ inducing the home ￿rm to export by lowering its standard below the level prevailing under
FDI. Relative to the case in which environmental policy is not adjusted, pollution havens that would have
existed do not come about when FDI is prevented while other pollution havens that would have not existed
are generated when FDI is attracted.
From a purely environmental perspective, we show that, relative to the export case, the home ￿rm￿ s FDI
results in two counteracting e⁄ects in the foreign country: an emission standard e⁄ect which amounts to a
reduction in emission standards and a scale e⁄ect which amounts to an increase in output. As the former
e⁄ect dominates the latter (given the convexity of costs/damages), FDI leads to a cleaner environment in
4This is similar to strategic investment to raise a rival￿ s costs, as in Salop and Sche⁄man (1983). Here, the intention is not
to increase the rival￿ s abatement cost (it may in fact lower it) but to eliminate the gap between the costs of the two ￿rms.
5the foreign country (and thus worldwide) relative to the export case. However, when the foreign country
manipulates standards to either prevent or induce FDI, a dirtier world environment can result when FDI
is induced if the two countries do not di⁄er substantially in their valuation of environmental damage.
Relative to the FDI case, a cleaner environment obtains when export is induced if the two countries di⁄er
substantially in their valuation of environmental damage.
2 Model
We develop an oligopoly model of trade with two countries (h for home and f for foreign) and two goods
(x and y). Good y is the numeraire good produced under perfect competition with a constant-returns-to-
scale technology. There is no pollution associated with the production of good y. Good x, the polluting
(dirty) good, is produced by a single pro￿t-maximizing ￿rm in each country at zero marginal cost. For
convenience, we refer to home (foreign) country￿ s monopolist as ￿rm h (f).
We assume that preferences over the two goods are quasi-linear and the inverse demand for good x in
each country is linear, that is,




where xi denotes the total quantity of good x sold in country i : xi =
P
z=h;f
xzi., pi denotes the price of good
x in country i, and xzi denotes the output sold by country z￿ s ￿rm in country i: Firm i￿ s total production
is made of its sales in the domestic market denoted by xii and in the foreign market denoted by xij with
i 6= j. Firms compete in quantities (Cournot) in each market. For simplicity, we assume that each unit
of x produced generates one unit of pollution and that, as in Copeland and Taylor (1994), pollution is
purely local. Moreover, abatement is possible but costly. Speci￿cally, if a government imposes a cap on






















6To examine the implications of FDI access, we consider a three-stage game. In the ￿rst stage, countries
simultaneously decide over their environmental policy, choosing the welfare-maximizing emission standards
for local ￿rms. Welfare is de￿ned as the sum of consumer surplus (CS) and producer surplus (PS) less
environmental damages (￿). To di⁄erentiate between the two countries in terms of their environmental
attitude so that they select distinct emission standards, we assume that the home country places heavier
emphasis on environmental damages in its welfare.5 Hence, the welfare of the home country is
Wh(e) ￿ CSh(e) +
X
j=h;f
￿hj(e) ￿ (1 + w)￿h(e) (5)
whereas the welfare of the foreign country is
Wf(e) ￿ CSf(e) +
X
j=h;f
￿fj(e) ￿ ￿f(e); (6)
where e = [eh;ef] is the vector of emission standards, w > 0 captures the additional value that the home
country places on the environment, and ￿ij denotes the pro￿t of ￿rm i in country j.
The initial game setup is illustrated in Figure 1a. In the second stage of the game, ￿rm h decides
whether to serve the foreign market through export or FDI. In this setup, the ￿rm in the country with a
more stringent environmental standard could move production to the country with a more lax standard,
depending on the bene￿t of such a move relative to the cost of setting up a foreign plant, which we assume
to be ￿xed at F. As pre-commitment and time consistent policies have previously been compared in
Ulph and Valentini (2001) and Petrakis and Xepapadeas (2003), we assume for the most part the latter
(except when examining the benchmark of no policy reaction/adjustment). Finally, in the third stage,
￿rms engage in Cournot competition in the two product markets. We obtain the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium (SPNE) by backward induction.
3 Environmental Policy and Welfare under Export
To ￿nd the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE), it is necessary to determine the payo⁄s to the
countries and ￿rms from FDI and export. To begin, we consider the case where the home ￿rm exports
rather than relocates. This case further serves as a benchmark to study the implications of FDI for strategic
environmental policy and social welfare. Since each ￿rm produces within its own country, it is subjected
to the local emission standard. Hence, ￿rm i faces an endogenously determined emission standard ei and
5We would have qualitatively similar results by assuming that the two countries have di⁄erent weights on producer surplus.
However, as our focus is on environmental policy, how it responds to FDI, and how it can be manipulated to attract or prevent
FDI, we maintain the assumption that the two countries di⁄er in their environmental awareness.




xij ￿ ei; (7)















; i = h;f: (8)
It is immediate that the marginal cost of abatement is equal to abatement. We note that, in order to
maintain the focus of our analysis on the implications of asymmetric emission standards for foreign direct
investment, we ignore trade policy.6 We also ignore local taxation of pro￿ts, unlike Greaker (2003), so
pro￿ts return to country of ￿rm ownership.
Given the emission standards eh and ef, the pro￿t-maximizing output choices must satisfy
@￿i
@xii
= ￿ ￿ 3xii ￿ xji ￿ xij + ei = 0 (9)
@￿i
@xij
= ￿ ￿ 3xij ￿ xjj ￿ xii + ei = 0; i;j = h;f:
We simultaneously solve the above conditions to obtain the Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the export sce-
nario, namely,
xii = xij =
3￿ + 4ei ￿ ej
15
and pi =
3￿ ￿ ei ￿ ej
5
; (10)



















for i;j = h;f. Thus, ￿rm i￿ s total output increases with its own emission standard while it decreases with
its rival￿ s emission standard. Moreover, the e⁄ect on own output dominates the e⁄ect on rival output so























With the equilibrium behavior of ￿rms as above described, we next examine the ￿rst-stage welfare


























6Inclusion of tari⁄s would provide countries with an additional incentive for FDI (i.e., tari⁄ jumping) that would cloud the



























The ￿rst-order conditions for the above problems yield
@Wi
@ei







; i;j = h;f and i 6= j; (15)
where ￿ = 38￿








￿ w = ￿
313
225
￿ w < 0: (16)







Combining the above two ￿rst-order conditions, we obtain the negatively sloped reaction functions in


















< 0; i;j = h;f and i 6= j: (19)
The negative relationship between home environmental policy and foreign environmental policy stems from
the nature of Cournot competition and provides support for the presence of a pro￿t-shifting motive. We
also note that, while
@ef



















implying that the choice of the home country￿ s emission standard becomes less sensitive to the foreign
country￿ s choice as the home country becomes more environmentally conscious (or the additional weight
it places on environmental damages increases).7 Simultaneously solving the two conditions in (15), we can
7See appendix.
























































￿2 < 0; (22)
so that standards are tighter in the home country than in the foreign country. Thus, in the absence of an
FDI option, the home country can be considered as the more environmentally friendly or ￿green￿country
while the foreign country is the less environmentally friendly or the ￿grey￿country. Accordingly, as the
home country becomes more environmentally sensitive (as w increases), it chooses more stringent emission
























































































In the section that follows, we consider the case in which the home ￿rm (facing a more stringent
standard under export) is free to choose between export and FDI as a mode of entry into the foreign
8See appendix for more details on emission standards under export, FDI with accomodation, and environmental policy
adjustment to induce or prevent FDI.
10country. For the SPNE, we then endogenize the home ￿rm￿ s choice over the mode of entry and the choice
of environmental policy of the foreign country. We assume that the home country is passive in setting its
environmental policy (setting an optimal policy as if there was a ￿rm present) and receives no external
costs or bene￿ts from the presence or absence of its ￿rm. The home ￿rm then chooses whether to export
or engage in FDI given the relocation cost it faces and the environmental policy it will face in the foreign
country.
[Insert Figure 1a here]
4 Foreign Direct Investment
FDI occurs if it is pro￿table for the home ￿rm to move production to the foreign country in order to
take advantage of the higher emission standard in that country (or to level the playing ￿eld, as we discuss
below). By relocating production to the foreign country, the home ￿rm has to pay an exogenous plant-
level ￿xed cost equal to F. We ignore the possibility of reciprocal FDI and focus exclusively on the FDI
decision of the home ￿rm. In addition, we allow for the possibility that the FDI-recipient or host country
(i.e., the foreign country) bene￿ts or su⁄ers from the home ￿rm￿ s FDI. We denote the bene￿t (loss if
negative) as B and, for simplicity, assume that it is exogenously given. In essence, B captures spillover
e⁄ects of FDI in the host country. Although standard theory points to FDI-generated externalities which
raise the productivity of host factors of production (Glass and Saggi, 1999 and 2002), the evidence about
the presence of productivity spillovers is rather mixed. While a positive industry-level correlation between
FDI and productivity is detected in Caves (1974), Blomstr￿m (1986), and Dri¢ eld (2000), the incidence of
spillovers is found to be in￿ uenced by host industry￿ s and host country￿ s characteristics. At the micro-level,
no evidence of higher levels of total factor productivity is found in sectors with higher foreign participation
in Morocco (Haddad and Harrison, 1993), for Venezuelan manufacturing companies (Aitken and Harrison,
1999), and for low-technology Indian companies (Kathuria, 1998 and 2000).
































11Given the foreign country￿ s emission standard ef, the pro￿t-maximizing output choices must satisfy
@￿i
@xii
= ￿ ￿ 3xii ￿ xji ￿ xij + ef = 0 (28)
@￿i
@xij
= ￿ ￿ 3xij ￿ xjj ￿ xii + ef = 0; i;j = h;f and i 6= j:
Hence, in equilibrium, ￿rm i￿ s output levels are
xii = xij =
￿ + ef
5
; i;j = h;f and i 6= j: (29)
To determine the payo⁄s under FDI, we need to examine several cases which di⁄er in how the FDI-
recipient country (foreign country) reacts to FDI. First, we consider the case of no reaction to FDI: the
foreign country selects the emission standard above derived for the export scenario regardless of whether
FDI occurs. This corresponds to a traditional pollution haven hypothesis case (i.e. ￿rms move to countries
with weaker environmental policy without regard for what happens to policy if they move). Then, we
examine the case in which the foreign country endogenously determines its emission standard in response
to FDI; we thus obtain conditions under which the home ￿rm undertakes FDI and discuss the implications
of FDI for the foreign country￿ s welfare. Finally, we extend the game of Figure 1a to consider whether the
foreign country has incentives to manipulate its standard to prevent (attract) FDI when FDI yields higher
(lower) pro￿ts to the home ￿rm than exporting and discuss the welfare implications of such a strategy.
4.1 No response to FDI
In a typical pollution haven hypothesis case, ￿rms facing weaker environmental standards in foreign coun-
tries shift production to those countries (in our model through FDI) without in￿ uencing local standards.
With the foreign country choosing the emission standard prevailing under export, pro￿t maximization by
each ￿rm yields identical output levels as
xnr
ii (eex






; i;j = h;f and i 6= j; (30)

















































12We note that FDI only occurs if the home ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts are greater through FDI than through export.
Speci￿cally, if the ￿xed cost of relocating production to the foreign country is su¢ ciently low, the home








































or that the critical value of F (below which the home ￿rm engages in FDI) increases in w. In other words,
as the emission standards of the two countries become more asymmetric (as w increases), the home ￿rm
has greater incentives to engage in FDI in the foreign country.
If there exists no bene￿t from FDI, the foreign country strictly prefers the home ￿rm to export rather
than to perform FDI. There are three distinct e⁄ects of FDI on the foreign country: (i) a decrease in
the foreign ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts from a loss in competitive advantage; (ii) an increase in environmental damages
from a rise in local production; (iii) an increase in consumer surplus from a decrease in the price. The
￿rst two e⁄ects of FDI outweigh the last e⁄ect and foreign welfare falls if there exists no external bene￿t
from receiving FDI. Hence, we can always identify a (positive) critical bene￿t level, denoted by Bnr, above






































From an environmental perspective, whenever the home ￿rm engages in FDI and the foreign country
does not change its environmental policy, environmental damages are higher in the foreign country (and
therefore worldwide) relative to the export case.9
4.2 Optimal Response to FDI
Next, we consider the case in which the foreign country, in response to FDI, adjusts its emission standard.
If FDI occurs, the foreign country has two active producers within its borders and the home ￿rm faces the
9See appendix for details on critical F and B values.
13same standard set by the foreign country for the foreign ￿rm. Thus, the pro￿t-shifting motive disappears
while the environmental damage e⁄ect widens. As a result, the foreign country has an incentive to lower its
emission standard when faced with FDI, so that FDI acts as a disciplining device for governments wishing
to exploit environmental standards to gain competitive advantage. Stage three of the game remains the
same as in the no response case, so that output levels are given by (29). The foreign country, however,














as the optimal emission standard in the foreign country under FDI. Upon comparison of the above with
(21), we obtain
Proposition 1: The optimum emission standard in the foreign country is always more stringent when the
foreign country responds to FDI optimally relative to the export and no response cases. Furthermore, the













Since pollution is local, the foreign country not only takes into account the environmental damages
generated by its own ￿rm but also the damages generated by the home ￿rm. In the absence of any
adjustment in the emissions standard, consumer surplus is higher while producer surplus is lower since the
protection of the domestic industry a⁄orded by a weaker emission standard is lost as the home ￿rm enters
and receives the same protection. Moreover, emissions (thus environmental damages) rise signi￿cantly.
Since the foreign country￿ s bene￿t from FDI is exogenous, it does not a⁄ect the emission standard. In such
a case, the negative e⁄ects of FDI on producer surplus and environmental damage dominate the positive
e⁄ect on consumer surplus. Thus, as we illustrate in Figure 2, the foreign country has an incentive to
reduce its emission standard relative to the export case.
More interesting is the comparison of the emission standard in the foreign country (originally the grey
country) under FDI, which both the foreign and home ￿rms face, with the emission standard in the home
country (originally the green country) in the export scenario, that is,
eFDI
f ￿ eex
h ￿ 0 if w ￿ w; (41)
14where w = 1015
939 ￿ 1:08. Hence, we obtain
Proposition 2: When the foreign country (originally the grey country) responds optimally to the home
￿rm￿ s FDI, its emission standard falls below the home country￿ s (originally the green country) standard
under export if w is su¢ ciently low.
The above proposition implies that, when the home ￿rm engages in FDI and the two countries￿weights
on environmental damage are very di⁄erent, the grey country (the foreign country) selects an environmental
standard that is weaker than the standard of the originally green country (the home country) under export.
However, as we also show in Figure 2, the foreign country can become ￿greener￿than the green country
(the home country) when the two countries are su¢ ciently similar in weighing environmental damages.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
At high values of w, the standard in the foreign country is much higher than that in the home coun-
try. While FDI generates additional environmental damages and takes away pro￿t-shifting motives, thus
inducing the foreign country to lower its standard, these e⁄ects are not su¢ ciently large to eliminate the
policy gap resulting from a divergence in the two countries￿environmental positions. However, when the
two countries are similar (i.e., w is su¢ ciently low), the two countries￿emission standards are not very
di⁄erent in the export scenario so that the damage e⁄ect and weakened pro￿t-shifting e⁄ect under FDI
outweigh the environmental weight di⁄erential e⁄ect.
From a purely environmental perspective, the home ￿rm￿ s FDI results in two counteracting e⁄ects in
the foreign country: (i) an emission standard e⁄ect, according to which, when FDI is accommodated,
the foreign country￿ s emission standard falls (even below the green country￿ s standard under export when
w < w); (ii) a scale e⁄ect, according to which FDI raises the production level in the foreign country
relative to the export case and this, in turn, increases environmental damages for a given standard. The
former e⁄ect dominates the latter and FDI leads to a cleaner environment in the foreign country (and
thus worldwide) relative to the export case when the foreign country responds to the home ￿rm￿ s FDI
by lowering its emission standard. The environmental improvement does depend on w; speci￿cally, as w















































15Using the optimum emission standard eFDI



































Again, if the ￿xed cost of relocating production to foreign country is su¢ ciently low, the home ￿rm prefers































￿ 0 if w ￿ w; (47)
where w ￿ 0:43. We thus have
Proposition 3: The incentive to perform FDI is increasing in w. For w < w, the home ￿rm does not
engage in FDI. For w > w, the home ￿rm engages in FDI even if it entails facing tighter standards than
under export at values of w ranging between w and w.
As illustrated in Figure 3, the critical F value below which the home ￿rm engages in FDI, FFDI,
is increasing in w. In other words, as the emission standards become relatively more asymmetric (as w
increases), the home ￿rm has greater incentives to perform FDI in the foreign country. Also, as eFDI
f < eex
f
holds, FFDI < Fnr always obtains. For su¢ ciently small values of w (w < w), the home ￿rm does not
have any incentive to perform FDI in a country which adjusts its standard optimally and thus FFDI < 0
when w < w. However, there are instances in which the home ￿rm chooses to engage in FDI even though
the foreign emission standard falls below its own standard under export (since w > w). As w increases, the
gap between the two countries￿standards widens under export. Provided that w is not too large (w < w),
the home ￿rm prefers relocating to the foreign country, even if it ends up facing tighter standards, in order
to level the playing ￿eld. Intuitively, if the home ￿rm does not engage in FDI, its cost of abatement is
higher than that of its competitor. By relocating to the foreign country, the home ￿rm faces the same
marginal abatement cost as the foreign ￿rm so that it is no longer at a competitive disadvantage. When
w is su¢ ciently high (w > w), the home ￿rm faces a lower marginal abatement cost in the foreign country
under FDI relative to export. Hence, the home ￿rm has two reasons to engage in FDI: (i) to take advantage
16of lower abatement costs and (ii) to remove the competitive advantage of the foreign ￿rm resulting from
di⁄erences in standards.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
Comparing the FDI regions of no response and optimal response in Figure 3, we can see that some FDI
which would have occurred in the absence of accommodation is deterred when environmental standards
are optimally adjusted (dark grey shaded area). This suggests that optimal response weakens the incentive
to relocate production, thereby weakening the PHH (at least in the absence of manipulation of standards
to induce FDI, as we show below).
We can easily show that, if there exists no bene￿t from FDI, the foreign country strictly prefers the
home ￿rm to export rather than to engage in FDI. The (positive) critical bene￿t level, denoted by BFDI,

































Since the foreign country determines its emission standard optimally, the critical bene￿t level is smaller
than the one obtained under no response, that is, BFDI < Bnr, as we illustrate in Figure 4.
[Insert Figure 4 here]
There are two possible SPNE of the game described to this point, depending on the cost of relocation.
If the cost of relocation F is higher than the critical ￿xed cost for FDI, FFDI (which takes into account
what the foreign country does with its standard if the ￿rm relocates), the SPNE consists of the home ￿rm
not engaging in FDI and the foreign country setting its optimal export standard eex
f . However, if the cost
of relocation is lower than the critical F, the SPNE consists of the ￿rm engaging in FDI and the foreign
country choosing the optimal standard eFDI
f . These two potential outcomes are shaded in Figure 1a.
To enrich the game, we next consider the question of whether the foreign country can induce export
(FDI) via preventing (attracting) FDI by adjusting its standard (to in￿ uence the critical ￿xed cost of the
home ￿rm above or below the actual relocation cost), and, if so, whether this can lead to higher foreign
welfare.10 As we show in the section that follows, these possibilities arise as SPNE only when the external
10Industrial policy could be used here rather than environmental policy. Since the externality is environmental, it is not
unreasonable to adjust environmental policy to induce or prevent FDI. Further, national treatment rules of the WTO (Article
III) may prevent the use of industrial policy against foreign entrants.
17bene￿ts or costs of FDI take extreme values. In other words, the SPNE described to this point are also
SPNE of the extended game unless the external bene￿t is below a critical threshold when F < FFDI (so
that SPNE entails the foreign country tightening its policy to induce export) or when the external bene￿t
of FDI is above a di⁄erent (higher) threshold when F > FFDI (so the SPNE entails the foreign country
weakening its standard to induce FDI).
4.3 Adjustment in Emission Standards (Manipulation)
In the preceding analysis, the initial ￿xed cost of relocation restricts the foreign country to setting an
optimal response to FDI or export but the setup does not permit the country to be more proactive and
strategically in￿ uence the mode of entry of the home ￿rm. Although the foreign country sets its policy
before the mode of entry decision is made, the external bene￿ts or costs (being ￿xed) cannot directly
in￿ uence the choice of policy and therefore cannot impact the mode of entry. As such, the game to this
point best describes outcomes when there are limited costs or bene￿ts to FDI for the foreign country. This
strategic option adds a layer to the game, which is illustrated in Figure 1b. Here, the foreign country is
not required to manipulate its standard but has the option to do so if the bene￿ts or costs of FDI are such
that its welfare increases.
[Insert Figure 1b here]
If the foreign country can tighten or relax its standard to eliminate or generate incentives for the home
￿rm to engage in FDI, it can select its emission standard such that the home ￿rm is (at most) indi⁄erent
between export and FDI. For a given ef , the home ￿rm￿ s pro￿t under FDI is
￿FDI
h (ef) =
















From (15), the home country￿ s best response to a change in the foreign emission standard under export is




















18Using the expressions in (53), we obtain the emission standard in the foreign country (denoted by e ef) that
makes the home ￿rm indi⁄erent between export and FDI, that is, such that ￿FDI
h (ef) = ￿ex
h (ef), as




1 + 1024￿2(1 ￿ ￿2)2 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿2)[50F(161 + 97￿2) + 2752￿￿1]
(1 ￿ ￿2)(161 + 97￿2)
+
+
32￿1 + 96￿(1 ￿ ￿2) + 97￿1￿2
(1 ￿ ￿2)(161 + 97￿2)
: (54)
Hence, the home ￿rm strictly prefers export to FDI below e ef while it prefers FDI to export above e ef,
that is,
￿FDI
h (ef) < ￿ex
h (ef) when ef < e ef (55)
￿FDI
h (ef) > ￿ex








that is, e ef is increasing in F and decreasing in w. Intuitively, as w increases (the two countries become
more asymmetric in their valuation of environmental damages), the home ￿rm￿ s incentive to engage in
FDI increases as the gap between the emission standards of the two countries increases, so that the foreign
country can induce or prevent FDI with a lower standard. To understand the intuition behind the positive
e⁄ect of a change in F on the threshold standard e ef, we note that eFDI
f < e ef < eex
f for combinations of
F and w values at which the foreign country may opt for environmental policy manipulation to induce or
prevent FDI.11 If the home ￿rm has no incentive to engage in FDI under optimum standards (F > FFDI)
while the foreign country prefers FDI to export (B > BFDI), the foreign country must increase its standard
above eFDI
f to make FDI attractive (or, equally, to make export unattractive); hence, e ef > eFDI
f . If the
home ￿rm has an incentive to engage in FDI under optimum standards (F < FFDI) while the foreign
country prefers export to FDI (B < BFDI), the foreign country must lower its standard below eex
f to make
export attractive or FDI unattractive; hence, e ef < eex
f . We thus have that, as F increases, the home ￿rm￿ s
incentive to perform FDI decreases so that the foreign country has to increase its emission standard above
eFDI
f by more to induce FDI in the ￿rst instance (that is, when the home ￿rm does not want to engage in
FDI but the foreign country prefers FDI to export) while it has to decrease it below eex
f by less to induce
export in the second instance (that is, when the home ￿rm wants to engage in FDI but the foreign country
prefers export to FDI); in both cases, the threshold standard e ef increases as F increases.
11See appendix for more details on the relationships between e
FDI
f and e ef and between e
ex
f and e ef.
19When the foreign country prevents FDI by lowering its standard below eex
f and the home ￿rm decides
to export, the home country adjusts its emission standard as well. Given that the emission standards of the
two countries are strategic substitutes, a lower emission standard in the foreign country implies a higher
emission standard in the home country, that is,
e ef < eex
f =) e eh = ￿1 + ￿2e ef > eex
h ; (57)
we thus have that
eex
h < e eh < e ef < eex







so that the gap in environmental policy between the two countries narrows, through a tightening of the
foreign standard and a weakening of the home standard, when export is induced as opposed to being
optimally chosen by the home ￿rm.12
In the following subsection, we derive the conditions under which adjusting the emission standard to
induce export or FDI is in the interest of the foreign country. To this end, we compare the foreign country￿ s
welfare levels in the FDI and export scenarios using the adjusted emission standard above given. We ￿nally
examine the environmental implications of adjusting emission standards to induce or prevent FDI from a
global perspective as well as from the foreign country￿ s perspective.
4.3.1 Attracting FDI
We ￿rst consider the case in which the home ￿rm has no incentive to engage in FDI under optimum
standards (F > FFDI). In such a case, the foreign country can be better o⁄ by inducing FDI with e ef if
the bene￿t from FDI is su¢ ciently large, that is, WFDI






















3(2￿ + 7e ef)(2￿ ￿ 3e ef)
50
: (59)
It follows immediately that the above critical bene￿t level (B) rises with F and falls with w since the
foreign country has to make larger adjustments in its emission standard (this is more costly from a welfare
perspective) to induce FDI when F gets larger or w gets smaller. Also, as WFDI







we always obtain that B ￿ BFDI.
In light of the above, we have
Proposition 4: Suppose that F > FFDI holds. Then, the following SPNE result:




12See section on emission standards in the appendix.
20(ii) when B > B, the foreign country induces the home ￿rm to engage in FDI by adjusting its emission
standard to e ef where eFDI
f < e ef < eex
f .
The ￿rst of these two SPNE corresponds to the SPNE of the previous ￿no manipulation game￿ when
F > FFDI: as long as the external bene￿ts are su¢ ciently small, the foreign country simply accepts that
the home ￿rm wants to export and chooses the optimal policy for its own ￿rm. The new SPNE occurs
when these bene￿ts are large, so that while the ￿xed cost would normally induce the home ￿rm to export,
the foreign country ￿nds higher welfare from strategically weakening its policy to induce the home ￿rm to
relocate. We illustrate the equilibria for F = 0:01 and ￿ = 1 in Figure 5. For a given F, we use (47) to
obtain the value of w (b w) such that the home ￿rm prefers export for w < b w and FDI for w > b w. As F
increases, b w increases so that the home ￿rm prefers export for a wider range of w values. Hence, in terms
of Figure 5, the home ￿rm prefers export for w < 0:7159. However, for B > B, the foreign country prefers
FDI and thus induces the home ￿rm to engage in FDI by increasing its standard above eFDI
f ; for B < B, the
foreign country prefers export and the optimum export emission standards (eex
f and eex
h ) prevail. Induced
FDI results in a Pareto improvement over export: the home country is better o⁄ from higher producer
surplus and consumer surplus and lower environmental damages; the foreign country is better o⁄ from the
external bene￿ts of FDI and higher consumer surplus that o⁄set the additional environmental damages
and reduced producer surplus.
[Insert Figure 5]
From an environmental perspective, when we compare worldwide environmental damages under export
and under induced FDI, we obtain
Proposition 5: For a given F, there exists a wl such that ￿FDI










for w < wl
and ￿FDI










for w > wl, where wl = 0 if F = 0 and wl > 0 if F > 0; furthermore,
wl is increasing in F.
When the home ￿rm does not have any incentive to engage in FDI but the foreign country adjusts its
standard to induce FDI, the environment is dirtier under FDI relative to export when the two countries
are not substantially di⁄erent in their valuation of environmental damages unless the ￿xed cost is zero.
As the two countries become more asymmetric (w increases), the foreign country can induce FDI with a
smaller upward adjustment in its standard (from eex
f ) so that it becomes less likely for the environment
to be dirtier under FDI. Conversely, as the cost of FDI the home ￿rm faces increases, the foreign country
21has to adjust its standard upward by a larger amount in order to induce the home ￿rm to engage in FDI;
hence, the range of w values for which the environment is dirtier under FDI widens.
In Figure 6, we plot the critical F (FFDI), as a function of w, below which the home ￿rm prefers
FDI over export and two isovalues curves. The isovalue curve labelled DFDI shows the combinations of w
and F such that the world￿ s environmental damage under induced FDI is exactly the same as that under
export. Above the DFDI curve, damages are higher under induced FDI; below the curve, they are higher
under export. For a given F, the FFDI curve gives the critical w (b w) such that the home country prefers
export over FDI for w < b w. If B > B, the foreign country induces FDI by raising its standard above eFDI
f
to e ef; the resulting worldwide environmental quality is worse for w < wl and better for wl < w < b w.
[Insert Figure 6]
The positive environmental implications of inducing FDI hold true, although for a smaller range of w
values, when we only consider the foreign country￿ s pollution level. In Figure 7, we have isovalue curves for
foreign pollution level di⁄erences between induced FDI and export (DFDI
f ) and between FDI and induced
export (Dex
f ), in addition to the isovalue curves given in Figure 6 (DFDI and Dex) and the threshold level
of F above which the home ￿rm prefers export (FFDI). In Figure 7, we also show the contour of the set of
feasible F values for given w values (F ￿ F) as derived in the Appendix. Hence, the pollution level in the
foreign country is lower under induced FDI than under export for wfl < w < b w, with wl < wfl implying
that, for wl < w < wfl, environmental quality worsens in the foreign country but improves worldwide.13
[Insert Figure 7 here]
4.3.2 Preventing FDI
We next consider the case in which the home ￿rm has an incentive to engage in FDI under optimum
standards (F < FFDI). The foreign country can then be better o⁄ by inducing export with e e if the bene￿t
from FDI is su¢ ciently small or negative, that is, Wex







B < B = 8
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Since the foreign country is able to induce export with a smaller adjustment in its emission standard (this
is less costly from a welfare perspective) as F increases or w decreases, B rises with F and falls with w.
Also, as Wex







, we always obtain that B ￿ BFDI. We thus have
13For F = 0:02, the home ￿rm may be induced to engage in FDI for w < b w ￿ 1:09. If FDI is induced, the pollution level
increases in the foreign country for w < wfl ￿ 1:01 and worldwide for w < wl ￿ 0:81. Hence, environmental quality improves
in the foreign country for 1:01 < w < 1:09 and worldwide for 0:81 < w < 1:09.
22Proposition 6: Suppose that F < FFDI holds. Then, the following SPNE obtain:
(i) when B > B, the home ￿rm engages in FDI and the foreign country chooses its optimum emission
standard eFDI
f ;
(ii) when B < B, the foreign country induces the home ￿rm to export by adjusting its emission standard
to e ef while the home country uses e eh where eex
h < e eh < e ef < eFDI
f < eex
f .
The ￿rst of these two SPNE corresponds to the SPNE of the ￿no manipulation game￿from above when
F < FFDI: as long as the external costs of FDI are su¢ ciently small, the foreign country accepts FDI and
chooses the optimal policy for the two ￿rms present. The new SPNE occurs when these costs are signi￿cant,
so that while the ￿xed cost would normally induce the home ￿rm to relocate, the foreign country ￿nds
higher welfare from strategically strengthening its policy to eliminate the incentive to move. We illustrate
the above equilibria in Figure 5 as well for a given positive F and ￿. The home ￿rm prefers FDI for
w > 0:7159. However, for B < B, the foreign country prefers export and thus induces the home ￿rm to
export by decreasing its standard below eFDI
f ; for B > B, the foreign country prefers FDI and thus the
optimum emission standard under FDI (eFDI
f ) prevails. The four possible SPNE are shaded in Figure 1b;
there is a unique SPNE for each pairing of F and B.
From an environmental perspective, when we compare worldwide environmental damages under FDI
and induced export, we have





















i (e eh;e ef) for w > wu; further, wu is increasing in F.
When the home ￿rm does have an incentive to engage in FDI but the foreign country adjusts its standard
to induce export, the environment is dirtier under FDI relative to export when the two countries are
substantially di⁄erent in their valuation of environmental damages. As the two countries become more
symmetric (w decreases), the foreign country can induce export with a smaller downward adjustment in
its standard (from eex
f ) so that it becomes less likely for the environment to be dirtier under FDI. As the
cost of FDI the home ￿rm faces increases, the foreign country has to adjust its standard downward by a
smaller amount in order to induce the home ￿rm to export; hence, the range of w values for which the
environment is dirtier under FDI narrows.
In Figure 6, the isovalue curve labelled Dex gives the combinations of w and F such that the world￿ s
environmental damage under FDI is exactly the same as that under induced export. Above the Dex curve,
damages are lower under FDI; below the curve, they are higher under induced export. For a given F (e.g.,
23F = 0:01), the FFDI curve gives the critical w (b w) such that the home ￿rm prefers FDI over export for
w > b w. If B < B, the foreign country induces export by lowering its standard below eex
f to e ef; the resulting
worldwide environmental quality is worse for b w < w < wu and better for w > wu.
As in the induced FDI case, we ￿nd that it is possible for the foreign pollution level under FDI to be
lower than the pollution level under induced export. In terms of Figure 7, we have that environmental
quality improves both in the foreign country and worldwide for b w < w < wfu but improves only worldwide
for wfu < w < wu.14
5 Conclusion
An important question that has largely been ignored in the literature on the relationship between FDI and
environmental policy is about strategic considerations countries entertain in setting their environmental
standards under the threat of increased production from FDI, particularly when pollution is local. Accord-
ing to the standard PHH argument, as it relates to FDI, production shifts from countries with stringent
standards to countries with weaker standards. Although there are many other factors determining plant
location, the idea that ￿rms would chase lower standards is not unreasonable and could lead to a ￿race to
the bottom￿in environmental policy. Surprisingly, the empirical evidence on the PHH is limited and, while
empirical reasons have been suggested why the PHH may not hold (e.g., data, measurement of environ-
mental stringency), theoretical explanations for the possible failure of the PHH have not been thoroughly
explored. In this paper, we attempt to provide one of such theoretical explanations by examining the rela-
tionship between FDI and endogenous standards, and leave the empirical investigation of the implications
of FDI for environmental policy to future work. We also consider only relocation as the preferred mode of
FDI entry and do not examine other methods of entry like joint ventures (see Javorcik and Saggi, 2010).
Aside from considering the question of whether and when di⁄erences in environmental policies trigger ￿rms
in countries with stringent standards to move production to countries with less stringent standards, we also
examine the impact that FDI has on the global pollution level as well as on the state of the environment
in FDI-recipient countries.
We show that standards can become tighter in the face of FDI and, although unlikely, may even become
stricter in the originally grey country than in the originally green country (this would happen in instances
in which the two countries are not very di⁄erent in how they value environmental damages). Thus, when
14For F = 0:02, the home ￿rm may be induced to engage in export for w > b w ￿ 1:09. If export is induced, the pollution
level increases in the foreign country for w > wfu ￿ 1:26 and worldwide for w > wu ￿ 1:71. Hence, environmental quality
improves in the foreign country for 1:09 < w < 1:26 and worldwide for 1:09 < w < 1:71.
24environmental policy is endogenous, the PHH is weakened by the fact that the tightening of standards in
FDI-recipient countries creates weaker incentives for FDI. The standard in the grey (FDI-recipient) country
is in fact always stricter under FDI, when the country responds optimally to FDI, than under export.
When the grey country adjusts its environmental policy in response to FDI, the di⁄erential in envi-
ronmental standards between the two countries is smaller, for a given gap in environmental friendliness
between the two countries, than it would be without a reaction to increased domestic production and pol-
lution, and decreases as the two countries become more divergent. In this way, FDI acts as a disciplining
device for countries considering weakening their environmental standards for competitive gain. At the same
time, the strengthening of standards under FDI serves to reduce incentives for relocation of production, so
that less relocation occurs due to di⁄erences in environmental standards. This amounts to a weakening of
the traditional pollution haven hypothesis: ￿rms may not choose to relocate in response to di⁄erences in
environmental policy as, by so doing, they would face stricter standards in the new location.
We then derive conditions under which the foreign country has incentives to manipulate its standard to
induce FDI when the home ￿rm prefers export (when the ￿xed cost of FDI is above its threshold level) or
to induce export when the home ￿rm prefers FDI (when the ￿xed cost of FDI is below its threshold level).
Whenever manipulation is optimal, the foreign standard is weaker when FDI is induced than when it is not,
and stricter when export is induced than under export. The possible manipulation of environmental policy
by the foreign country to induce or prevent FDI, depending on whether the bene￿t from FDI exceeds or
falls short of its threshold level, has important implications for the overall e⁄ect of FDI on the state of the
environment. In fact, while FDI always results in a cleaner environment in the foreign country (and thus
worldwide) in the absence of manipulation as the emission standard e⁄ect (tightening of foreign standard)
always dominates the scale e⁄ect (increase in production in the foreign country) due to the convexity of
the damage function, whether FDI yields a cleaner or dirtier environment in the presence of manipulation
depends on how di⁄erent the two countries are in their valuation of the environment. Speci￿cally, FDI
worsens (improves) the environment when the two countries are quite similar (di⁄erent) and FDI is induced
or when the two countries are quite di⁄erent (similar) and FDI is not induced.
That di⁄erences in environmental awareness play an important role in how FDI a⁄ects the environment
stems from the fact that incentives to engage in FDI increase with the home country￿ s environmental
awareness over and above that of the foreign country; the more di⁄erent the two countries are, the larger
the gap in their environmental standards and the greater the bene￿ts the home ￿rm can derive from FDI.
When FDI is induced, the foreign standard is less stringent than in the absence of manipulation but the gap
25between the two standards decreases as the home ￿rm￿ s incentives for FDI increase (that is, as the home
country becomes more environmentally conscious); hence, the more similar the two countries are, the larger
the gap and the dirtier the environment. On the other hand, when FDI is not induced, the foreign standard
is more stringent than under export but the gap between the foreign standard under FDI and the foreign
standard under induced export decreases as the home country becomes more environmentally conscious (or
the incentives for FDI increase); hence, the more di⁄erent the two countries are, the smaller the gap and
the dirtier the environment. Overall, whenever FDI occurs with or without inducement, pollution is likely
to decrease in FDI-recipient countries and worldwide whenever there exist neither trivial nor substantial
di⁄erences in environmental attitude between the FDI-recipient and the FDI-source countries. As the cost
of engaging in FDI increases, pollution is less likely to decrease under FDI, particularly in less divergent
countries; in other words, the more costly FDI is, the less similar the two countries have to be in their
environmental awareness for pollution to decrease under FDI.
The presence of external bene￿ts of FDI has thus additional implications for the pollution haven
hypothesis: if FDI provides signi￿cant external bene￿ts to the recipient nation, we would expect to see more
PHH-induced relocation of production as countries weaken standards to attract investment (light grey area
in Figure 5); if the spillover e⁄ects of FDI are small or negative, countries may tighten standards to prevent
PHH-driven relocation of production (dark grey area in Figure 5). Equilibrium outcomes ultimately depend
on the ￿xed costs of relocation and how di⁄erently countries weigh environmental damages. Nonetheless,
we show that, in most cases, FDI results in a tightening of environmental policy and is likely to improve the
quality of the world environment (at least among countries that are similar in production and abatement
technology that account for environmental damages when setting policy).
6 Appendix
6.1 Emission standards
Using the ￿rst-order conditions for welfare maximization with respect to the standards, we can write the
























while the slope of the foreign country￿ s reaction function is independent of w.
Letting ￿ = 1
112+75w, ￿ = 1
698+525w, and ￿ = 1
6496+4695w, we can express the export standards as
eex
h = 2204￿￿ and eex




h = 1710￿￿w > 0;











The foreign standard prevailing under FDI in the absence of any response by the foreign country is the
same as that under export, that is, eex
f .








































which is positive for w > w = 1015
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27which gives the range of feasible F values for the system to yield a real solution as
F < F =
450
23
￿2 (13 + 16w)
2 ￿￿;
hence, we have that
e ef ￿ e eh =
15
23
[(390 + 480w)￿ ￿ M]￿ > 0:
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@e eh
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= ￿2850￿￿2 < 0;
we can conclude that
@e ef
@w < 0 for F > 0.
When comparing e ef with eex
f and e eh with eex
h , we have that e ef ￿eex
f = e eh￿eex
h = 0 for F = Fex
ind, where
Fex
ind = 342(7540 + 6957w)￿2￿2w = Fnr;
e ef ￿ eex




@F > 0, and e eh ￿ eex




@F < 0: We then
obtain that, for F < FFDI < Fex
ind, that is, whenever export may have to be induced as the home ￿rm
would engage in FDI, e ef ￿ eex
f < 0 and e eh ￿ eex
h > 0. As eex
h < e eh < e ef < eex
f , the gap in standards under
export is narrower when export is induced than when it is optimally chosen by the home ￿rm, that is,
e ef ￿ e eh < eex
f ￿ eex
h for F < FFDI.
When we compare e ef with eFDI
f , we have that e ef ￿ eFDI
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2 ;
and e ef ￿ eFDI




@F > 0. Upon comparison of FFDI
























hence, for any F > FFDI > FFDI
ind , that is, whenever FDI may have to be induced as the home ￿rm would
not engage in FDI, e ef ￿ eFDI
f > 0.
286.2 Critical F and B values
Upon comparison of FFDI with Fnr, that is, the threshold levels of F below which the home ￿rm engages
in FDI when the foreign country adjusts its standard in response to FDI and when it does not, we obtain
that

































￿2￿2 > 0 i⁄ w > 0:43;
furthermore, we know that




422240 + 519829w + 146175w2￿2 ￿2￿￿￿2 > 0;
where F is the largest feasible value of F, as above de￿ned, when we consider the possibility of policy
manipulation to induce or prevent FDI. We thus derive the marginal e⁄ects of w on the two critical F
values as well as their di⁄erence as
@Fnr
@w











= 138(1450 + 849w)￿￿2eex
h > 0;
respectively.
Similarly, upon comparison of BFDI with Bnr, that is, the threshold levels of B above which the foreign
country is better o⁄ with FDI when it adjusts its standard in response to FDI and when it does not, we
have that















1459976 + 2541560w + 1197225w2￿
￿2￿2 > 0:
29Hence, we can express the marginal e⁄ects of w on the two critical B values and their di⁄erence as
@Bnr
@w
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Figure 1a:  Tree diagram of the game between the foreign country and the home firm under the assumption 
that the foreign country does not manipulate its standard to induce firms to perform FDI when the 
cost of relocation is high or induce firms to export when the cost of relocation is low. Shaded boxes 
represent SPNE depending on  . 
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Figure 1b:  Tree diagram of the game between the foreign country and the home firm when foreign country 
has the option to manipulate standards to induce or deter FDI. The foreign country manipulates its 
standard to induce FDI when          and       and to induce export when          and    
 , but does not manipulate standards when          and        or when          and      . 
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Figure 5:  Possible equilibria (                  
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